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Abstract
This paper investigates the holdup problem in the dynamic search
market where buyers and sellers search for their trading partners and
speci¯c investments are made after match but before trade. We show
that frictionless (competitive) market imposes severe limitations on
attainable e±ciencies: Markets with small friction make the holdup
problem more serious than those with large friction because in any
equilibrium, whether stationary or non{stationary, investment must
be dropped down to the minimum level and trade must be delayed
with positive probability.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we investigate the holdup problem in the dynamic search mar-
ket where buyers and sellers search for their trading partners and speci¯c
investments are made after matching but before trade decisions. In particu-
lar we address the issues of whether or not frictionless (competitive) market
helps mitigate the holdup problem. Our answer to this question is negative:
In fact we show that markets with small friction make the holdup problem
more serious and result in signi¯cant ine±ciency, which never happens in
the markets with large friction.
What is the holdup problem? Suppose that a seller delivers one indivis-
ible good to a buyer and makes \speci¯c" investment which has value only
for the trade relationship with the buyer in question. For example the seller
may need to make customized investment which meets the speci¯c require-
ments of the buyer. Then, they are locked in \bilateral monopoly" situation
and bargain over trade decision ex post after seller's speci¯c investment was
sunk. In the absence of complete contingent contracts the seller expects
that some fraction of the return from his investment will be captured by the
buyer through ex post negotiation, which in turn undermines the seller's ex
ante investment incentives. This is called the \holdup problem."
The holdup problem has played the central role to understanding organi-
zational design and boundaries of ¯rms (See for example Willimason (1975,
1985), Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart
and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995)). These studies have discussed the so-
lutions to the holdup problem through allocation of ownership rights (such
as vertical integration). Other authors also proposed the mechanism design
approach to resolve the holdup problem (See Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey
(1994), Chung (1991) and Rogerson (1992)). However most of the existing
studies have focused on bilateral trade games of particular parties by taking
outside markets as exogenously given. Thus these studies have ignored the
interactions between the holdup problem in bilateral trade and the mar-
ket environments which govern the processes of trading opportunities such
as how trading parties ¯nd alternative partners when current negotiation
fails. In other words the reservation values of players, which determine the
payo®s of players when they fail to trade with current partners, have been
exogenously ¯xed in the models.
In this paper we will consider the holdup problem in the market en-
vironment with search friction which endogenously determines the players'
reservation values. We will investigate the dynamic search market in which
there are many buyers and sellers and each buyer (seller) searches a seller
(buyer) for trading one indivisible good. Each buyer consumes at most
one good and each seller can deliver at most one good. They are randomly
matched with each other with search friction: Some of buyers (sellers) fail to
meet sellers (buyers). After matching a buyer, seller makes \match speci¯c"
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investment, which has the value only for the current match, before trade
decision of the good. Since they can trade at most one good, all matched
parties leave the market after they trade the goods. If matched parties do
not agree on trading the good, they stay in the market and start searching
for the next match again.
Alternatively our model can be interpreted as the \marriage market"
with investment choices: 1 Male and female search for their partners and
they make \match speci¯c investment" for building trust relationship with
matched partner, knowing each other well, cooperating in housework pro-
ductions and so forth after matching. These investments have no values for
all other matches than the current one. After agreeing on marriage, the
parties leave the market.
In this dynamic search model the market friction is measured by the
inverse of the discount factor of players and the probability of failing to
meet a partner. Thus the market becomes frictionless as the discount factor
and matching probability go to one. One might think that, since small fric-
tion makes the market more competitive, resulting market outcomes become
more e±cient as search friction tends to be smaller.
However, in contrast to this intuition, we show that frictionless markets
become highly less e±cient than those with large friction. This is because
markets with small search friction make the holdup problem more serious
than those with large friction. In fact we show that in any equilibrium,
whether stationary or non{stationary, sellers' investments must be dropped
down to the minimum level, zero, and trades must be signi¯cantly delayed
with positive probability for in¯nitely many times, although these features
never happen in the markets with large search friction.
This ine±ciency result follows from the dynamic interactions between
current and future sellers' investment incentives: Suppose that everyone
expects the future sellers will make high investment. Then the \reservation
values" for the current players become high because they expect high trade
values will be realized in the future matches. This is more likely to be
the case when search friction becomes small. However, if the reservation
values of the current players are high, ex post surplus in the current match,
which is de¯ned as the current trade value minus the sum of the reservation
values of buyer and seller for a given investment, becomes small. Each
matched seller obtains his bargaining payo® from the negotiation over such
ex post surplus after his investment was sunk. When the ex post surplus
is expected to be small, the currently matched sellers will ¯nd it costly to
make high investment. This will then undermine the sellers' investments.
On the other hand, suppose that everyone expects the future sellers will
make low investment. Then, the reservation values of the currently matched
1See for example Peters and Siow (2002) for the recent model of the marriage market
with investment choices.
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players become small because they expect low trade values will be realized
in the future matches. However, then the ex post trade surplus in the
current match becomes high and hence the current period sellers have more
incentives to make high investment.
Thus the investment incentives of current sellers move in the opposite
direction with those of the future sellers: If future sellers will have more
incentives to make high investment, current sellers have less incentives to
do so, and vice versa. This argument leads to the following results: First, if
there exists a symmetric stationary equilibrium in which all matched sellers
choose the same investment strategy in all periods, it must involve mixed
strategy to randomize between high and low investments. Second, if equilib-
rium is not stationary, it must exhibit some cyclical feature that equilibrium
investments °uctuate between high and low levels over time. In either case,
equilibrium investment must be low with some positive probability. Also,
whenever equilibrium investment goes down to zero, every match leads to
no{trade and hence trade must be delayed. This dynamic mechanism makes
the holdup problem more serious as search friction becomes smaller and
hence imposes severe limitations on attainable e±ciencies.
We will also investigate several extensions of the model: First, we in-
troduce heterogeneity of buyers and sellers into the model and then show
that our ine±ciency result still holds even in such case. Second, we allow
matched parties to write ex ante contracts contingent on trade outcome be-
fore investment choice of matched seller. Then we show that there exists
some equilibrium when ex ante contracts are possible, which is less e±cient
than the equilibrium when ex ante contracts cannot be written at all, if
search friction becomes small enough. Thus enlarging the set of possible
contracts may make the market e±ciency worse than the case of no ex ante
contracts. This might lead to the implication that it may not be optimal
to make markets competitive in developing countries with limited contract
enforcement. Third, we examine the two{sided investment case that both
sides of matched parties (buyer and seller) make speci¯c investments before
trade. Then we ¯nd that in the symmetric example in which both buyer
and seller have identical preferences the two{sided investment helps recover
e±ciency even when it is lost in the one{sided investment case. However,
ine±ciency arises again when buyer and seller are heterogeneous.
Related Literature
Several recent papers have paid attentions to the holdup problem in mar-
ket environments and its implications about the e®ects of competition (See
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (2001), Felli
and Roberts (2002) and MacLeod and Malcomson (1993)). Some among
these studies show that market competition may help recover the ¯rst best
e±ciency. In contrast to this, our result highlights on the negative e®ects of
\competition" on the holdup problem where in our model the competitive
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environment can be interpreted as the market with small search friction.2
Our ine±ciency result is also in contrast to the recent paper by Che and
S¶akovics (2004) who investigate the holdup problem in a dynamic setting
and show that there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium to attain the ef-
¯cient outcome when discount factor goes to one.3 De Mezza and Lock-
wood (2004) also reported that ine±ciency may arise when search friction
becomes small, although the ine±ciency in their model comes from the over-
investment (not underinvestment) problem due to coordination failure in the
frictional matching market.
Some papers have also focused on the issues of holdup problem in ran-
domly matching markets (Acemoglu (1996, 2001) and Acemoglu and Shimer
(1999)) where investing parties make ex ante investments before matching in
contrast to our approach that investments are made after matching. Which
approach of ex ante or ex post investment is more plausible depends on dif-
ferent economic circumstances we have in mind. Ex ante investments may
¯t to the cases of general human capital investment (education) by workers
and physical capital installment by ¯rms before employment. On the other
hand, ex post investments may ¯t to the cases of the parties making cus-
tomized investments (as is often observed in the productions of automobile
parts) and building speci¯c relationships with matched partners (as in the
marriage market).
When we interpret our model as the marriage market as we have men-
tioned before, our result that competitive markets exaggerate the holdup
ine±ciency is also in contrast to the papers showing the e±ciency property
of competitive marriage markets (See for example Peters and Siow (2002)).
We can also relate our result to the literature about delay in bargaining
games. Several papers have shown the phenomena of delay in bargaining
games with complete information (See for example Busch and Wen (1995),
Cai (2000), Jehiel and Moldovanu (1995a, 1995b) and S¶akovics (1993)). 4
However, most of the existing studies have assumed that the trade value,
which is a pie to be split between negotiating parties, is exogenously given.
On the other hand, in our model the trade value is endogenously determined
by players' strategies in equilibrium and this leads to signi¯cant delay of
trade.5 Frankel (1998) examines the bargaining game in which players exert
2Also, most of the papers cited above have focused on the classical holdup problem
which assumes no contracts are possible before investment choices. In our paper we
will examine the extension of the basic model to allow matched parties to write ex ante
contracts before investments are made. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) also consider a
related issue but they assume wage posting by ¯rms before ex ante investment and search
decisions.
3In their model a buyer and a seller repeatedly interact with each other and there are
no elements of switching partners in markets.
4See also Jehiel and Moldovanu (2004) for the phenomena of gradualism in contribution
and bargaining games.
5Merlo and Wilson (1995) consider the situation in which a pie to be split between bar-
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creative e®orts to expand the set of proposals, although the main focus was
on premature agreement which means that players agree on trade before
total pie is larger. Also, most of the above papers have focused on repeated
negotiations between particular players while we will consider the dynamic
matching market in which a buyer and a seller interact each other only once
after they match together and they will not meet again in the future.6
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows: In Section
2 we will set up the basic model of dynamic search market with the holdup
problem. In Section 3 we will characterize the search market equilibria
and in Section 4 we will show that small search friction makes the holdup
problem worse and causes serious ine±ciency. In Section 5 we will extend
the basic model in several directions.
2 Model
2.1 Search Market
We consider the dynamic search market in which buyers and sellers are ran-
domly matched with each other. Time is discrete and extends over in¯nity,
t = 0; 1; 2::: There is a single consumption good. At initial period (t = 0)
there are a unit mass of buyers and a unit mass of sellers in the market.
Seller is indexed by i 2 [0; 1] and buyer by j 2 [0; 1]. Each buyer can
consume at most one good and each seller can produce at most one good.
Each buyer (seller) matches a seller (buyer) with probability ® 2 (0; 1). If
matched parties agree on trading the good, they leave the market because
they can trade at most one good. There is no new entry into the market at
all. Thus in every period the measure of buyers is same as that of sellers.7
The underlying assumption is here that the matching technology exhibits
the constant returns to scale.
gainers is changed over time, although such change follows exogenous stochastic process.
6Samuelson (1992) also considers the bargaining in a dynamic matching market and
shows that delay of trade is observed as an equilibrium outcome. However, in Samuelson
(1992) the asymmetric information between matched parties causes delay of trade while
in our model there are no uncertainty but delay is observed.
7We can also consider alternative scenarios about matching process: First, we may
assume that there are exogenous new in°ows of players into the market at rate ® 2 (0; 1)
in each period. Then the population sizes of buyers and sellers can be kept at constant
equal to a unit measure over time in any stationary equilibrium. Second, we may assume
that all the players who left the market are replaced by the same measure of new players.
In that case the population sizes of buyers and sellers become constant over time even in
non{stationary equilibrium. In any modeling choice the important point is that all players
who traded leave the market. This makes the \outside option" relevant for trade decision.
Many pagers in the literature about bargaining and contract choices in the search markets
follow this approach. See for example Inderst (2001), Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) and
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) for the related models sharing the same approach.
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After matching a buyer, matched seller makes \match speci¯c" invest-
ment a 2 A ½ <+ which a®ects both the buyer's bene¯t from consuming the
good b(a) (cooperative investment) and the production cost of seller (sel¯sh
investment) d(a). We will call v(a) ´ b(a)¡d(a) the trade value. The seller's
investment is \match speci¯c" in the sense that each matched seller's in-
vestment has the value only for the trade with the currently matched buyer.
Thus it has no values in all other matches. For example the seller needs
to make customized investment which meets some speci¯c requirements of
the buyer. In fact customized inputs are often required for productions
of automobiles. Also in the marriage market matched partners need to
make \match speci¯c" investments for building trust relationships with the
matched partners, knowing each other well, cooperating in housework pro-
ductions and so forth. These investments are however worthless for all other
matches. 8
Note here that we make no restrictions on the seller's investment a 2 A.
a is allowed to be both discrete and continuous.
The seller personally incurs the cost of investment c(a). We assume that
both v and c are increasing and that v(0) > 0 and mina2A c(a) = c(0) = 0.
As in the traditional approach to the holdup problem, we assume that seller's
investment a 2 A is observable to the buyer who matched the seller in
question but not veri¯able. We also assume that no contracts are possible
before seller's investment choice a 2 A. We will discuss how ex ante contracts
a®ect the results in Section 5. Note also here that we make no restrictions
on v and c except that they are increasing.
After seller's investment choice, the matched parties decide whether or
not to trade the good. We here assume the simple bargaining process: With
probability ¯ 2 (0; 1) the seller makes a take{it{or{leave{it o®er to the
buyer about trade decision and payment while with probability 1 ¡ ¯ the
buyer makes a take{it{or{leave{it o®er to the seller about trade decision
and payment. This is equivalent to assuming the Nash bargaining solution
which has been commonly used in the literature.
All players are risk neutral and discount their future payo®s at the com-
mon discount factor ± 2 (0; 1).
The outside payo® of each player is normalized to zero. Thus each player
obtains the payo® of zero if he or she does not trade the good in the current
period.
8We can explicitly introduce some \speci¯city" aspects of trade into the model. In
each match some random state ´ is independently drawn from [0; 1]. Then the buyer who
has drawn ´ needs the good with speci¯cation ´. Then trade value is realized as v(a)
when the matched seller delivers the good with speci¯cation ´ and chooses the investment
a to enhance such value. On the other hand, when the seller does not deliver the good
meeting the buyer's required speci¯cation ´ the trade value is given by v ´ v(0) > 0
irrespective of his investment. Here we can interpret the minimum investment level a = 0
as the \general" investment which attains the minimum trade value v whatever buyer's
required speci¯cation.
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Each period is divided into three dates. The timing of events in a period
is as follows:
date 0 Buyers and sellers randomly match. The matched parties make a
lump{sum transfer, which is used to distribute the ex ante total surplus
between them as we will explain below. A matched seller makes a take{
it{or{leave{it o®er of lump{sum transfer with probability ° 2 (0; 1)
while a matched buyer does so with probability 1¡ °.
date 1 The matched seller makes match speci¯c investment a 2 A.
date 2 The matched parties bargain to decide whether or not they trade the
good and how much they make payments. If they agree on trading
the good, the seller produces and delivers the good to the buyer who
consumes it. Then they leave the market. Otherwise they stay in the
market and search for the next match.
The friction in the search market described above is inversely related
to the discount factor ± and the matching probability ® 2 (0; 1): If these
values are large, the market is said to have small friction because the trades
of the goods are quickly made and many matches can form. Then our main
concern is to investigate how equilibrium outcomes in the search market
change when the market friction goes to zero.
As we have said, our model can be also interpreted as the marriage mar-
ket where male and female search for each other and make \match speci¯c"
investment after matching. Then they leave the market after they agree on
marriage.
2.2 The Static Benchmark
First we consider the static benchmark which corresponds to the case that
the market friction is extremely high (± = 0) in the above dynamic search
model.
In this static case all players obtain their outside payo®, zero, when they
do not trade the goods. Thus ex post surplus, which is de¯ned as the trade
value v(a) minus the reservation values the parties will obtain under no trade
agreement, is simply given by the trade value v(a) itself.
Since seller can extract ¯ fraction of ex post surplus v(a), he obtains the
following payo®:
¯v(a)¡ c(a): (1)
The seller chooses the speci¯c investment a 2 A to maximize this payo®.
Let as 2 A be the static equilibrium investment:
as 2 argmax
a2A
¯v(a)¡ c(a): (2)
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We de¯ne the ex ante surplus as
S(a) ´ v(a)¡ c(a); (3)
and make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. as is unique and as 6= 0.
Assumption 1 ensures that ¯v(as)¡ c(as) > ¯v(0).
3 Search Market Equilibria
Next we turn to the dynamic search market model. Since matching is ran-
dom and the set of players is continuum, it is the measure zero event that
each player can meet the same partner again as he or she has previously
matched. Also, the market is anonymous in the sense that any player can-
not observe the past history about what decisions the matched partner has
made. Thus each matched seller simply chooses his current period invest-
ment in order to maximize his payo® by taking his own and the buyer's
reservation values as given. These assumptions are all standard in the liter-
ature of dynamic matching markets.
The main di®erence of this dynamic model from the static game is that
the reservation values of players are endogenous. Here the reservation value
of a player means the discounted present value of his or her future payo®s to
be obtained when he or she does not trade the good in the current period.
Consider a matched pair of a buyer and a seller in period t. Then let
U bt and U
s
t denote the reservation values of the buyer and the seller, which
they will obtain when they do not trade the good in the current period t.
Then the ex post surplus from this match is de¯ned as the trade value
v(a) minus these reservation values:
v(a)¡ U bt ¡ U st : (4)
After the investment has been sunk, as long as this surplus is non{negative,
the parties have the incentive to trade the good in the current period t. Then,
with probability ¯ the seller makes a take{it{or{leave{it o®er of payment
and obtains the payo® v(a)¡U bt . On the other hand, with probability 1¡¯
the buyer makes a take{it{or{leave{it o®er of payment and hence the seller
obtains the payo® U st . If the ex post surplus (4) is negative, they will not
trade the good and will stay in the market for searching the next matches,
in which case they simply obtain their reservation values.
Thus the seller's payo® from ex post negotiation is given by ¯maxfv(a)¡
U bt ¡ U st ; 0g + U st . Then the seller's net payo® subtracting his investment
cost c(a) can be written by
¯maxfv(a)¡ U bt ¡ U st ; 0g+ U st ¡ c(a): (5)
9
The seller will choose investment a 2 A to maximize this payo®. More
speci¯cally, the mixed strategy of matched seller i in period t is represented
by a probability measure f it 2 ¢(A) where ¢(A) is the set of all probability
measures on A. Let also Ef it [ ¢] denote the expectation operator according
to f it .
We give a de¯nition of equilibrium in the search market as follows:
De¯nition of Equilibrium. A sequence fft; U st ; U bt g1t=0 is said to be an
equilibrium in the search market if the following conditions are satis¯ed:
(i) Symmetry and Optimality of Seller's Investment: In period t each
matched seller follows the symmetric strategy ft to maximize his pay-
o®: Z
A
f¯maxfv(a)¡ U st ¡ U bt ; 0g+ U st ¡ c(a)gdft
¸
Z
A
f¯maxfv(a)¡ U st ¡ U bt ; 0g+ U st ¡ c(a)gdf 0 8f 0 2 ¢(A):
(ii) The Reservation Values: The buyer's and seller's reservation values
U bt and U
s
t are determined as follows:
U bt = ±f®ubt+1 + (1¡ ®)U bt+1g;
and
U st = ±f®ust+1 + (1¡ ®)U st+1g
where ubt+1 and u
s
t+1 are the payo®s of a matched buyer and a matched
seller respectively:
ust+1 ´ °maxfEft [S(a)]¡ U bt+1 ¡ U st+1; 0g+ U st+1;
and
ubt+1 ´ (1¡ °)maxfEft [S(a)]¡ U bt+1 ¡ U st+1; 0g+ U bt+1:
Condition (i) says that in period t each matched seller optimally chooses
symmetric strategy ft to maximize his payo®, given the reservation values
U bt and U
s
t . Since all sellers are identical, it is natural to focus on the
symmetric equilibrium in which all matched sellers follow the same strategy
in each period. However, note that this does not necessarily mean that the
sellers' equilibrium strategy is stationary because it may depend on time
index t.
Condition (ii) says that the reservation value of a buyer (resp. seller) U bt
(resp. U st ) in period t is the discounted present value of his or her expected
future payo®s which come from the payo® when matching ubt+1 (resp. u
s
t+1)
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and the reservation value U bt+1 (resp. U
s
t+1) when not matching respectively.
The former payo® is realized with probability ® 2 (0; 1), while the latter
payo® is realized with probability 1¡ ®. The buyer's (resp. seller's) payo®
ubt+1 (u
s
t+1) when matching is equal to ° fraction of ex ante total surplus
maxfEft+1 [S(a)]¡ U bt+1 ¡ U st+1; 0g
plus her (his) reservation value U bt+1 (resp. U
s
t+1). This is because the
seller has the chance of making a lump{sum transfer o®er to the buyer with
probability ° at date 0 in each period and hence he can extract ° fraction of
the ex ante surplus. Note that we are taking maxf¢; ¢g operator to express
these payo®s because the ex ante surplus may be negative, in which case
both parties simply obtain their reservation values U bt and U
s
t .
The reservation values of players U bt and U
s
t depend on what invest-
ments and trade decisions the future matched players will do. Then, since
the investment choices by the currently matched sellers are a®ected by the
reservation values, the current sellers' investments are indirectly linked with
those of the future sellers. This intertemporal linkage between the current
and future sellers' investments choices plays the central role in the following
analysis.
Note also that the sum of the reservation values of a buyer and a seller
U bt +U
s
t matters for determining the equilibrium investment of matched sell-
ers (how to distribute the ex ante surplus does not a®ect seller's investment
incentives). Once the total value U bt +U
s
t is determined, we can decompose
it into the separate values U bt and U
s
t by splitting it appropriately according
to ex ante bargaining power °. Thus in what follows we will mostly focus
on the determination of the total value U bt + U
s
t but not each of it.
We ¯rst show the following two lemmas both of which make the charac-
terization of equilibria much simpler.
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium any matched seller never chooses a =2 f0; asg
in any period t, i.e., ft(A n f0; asg) = 0 8 t.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 1 follows from Assumption 1 and the fact that the payo® function
of matched seller (5) attains its maximum at a = 0 or a = as (or both). In
particular we can readily show that each seller optimally chooses the static
investment as if and only if
v(as)¡ c(as)=¯ ¸ U bt + U st : (IC)
Otherwise, seller chooses the minimum investment a = 0. The reason for
this is as follows: Suppose that each matched seller chooses as. Then, since
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any seller can guarantee at least U st by choosing a = 0, we must have
¯maxfv(as) ¡ U bt ¡ U st ; 0g ¸ c(as) which then implies (IC). On the other
hand, each matched seller prefers a = as to a = 0 if ¯maxfv(as) ¡ U bt ¡
U st ; 0g ¡ c(as) ¸ ¯maxfv(0) ¡ U bt ¡ U st ; 0g. This inequality holds by (IC)
and de¯nition of as.
By Lemma 1 without loss of generality we can write the equilibrium
strategy of each matched seller by a probability xt 2 [0; 1] to choose a = as
and the remaining probability 1 ¡ xt to choose a = 0 in period t. Thus
in what follows we will refer to xt for denoting the equilibrium strategy of
matched sellers instead of using ft.
Lemma 2 In any equilibrium trade is (resp. not) realized in any period in
which a = as (resp. a = 0) is chosen.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 2 follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that trade occurs if and
only if the ex post surplus (4) is non{negative.
The equilibrium features crucially depend on the degree of search friction
which is represented by the discount factor ± 2 (0; 1). We de¯ne the cuto®
value of the discount factor, denoted ±¤ 2 (0; 1), to satisfy the following
equation:
¯
½
v(as)¡ ±
¤®S(as)
1¡ ±¤®
¾
= c(as): (6)
By Assumption 1, c(as) > 0 and ¯ < 1, such ±¤ 2 (0; 1) uniquely exists.
Then we ¯rst show the following result:
Proposition 1. Suppose that ± 2 (0; ±¤). Then equilibrium is unique and
has stationary property such that every matched seller chooses the static
equilibrium investment as with probability one in every period.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 states that when search friction is large the equilibrium
outcome coincides with the static one.
4 Small Search Friction and Ine±ciency
4.1 Low Investment and Delay of Trade
Next we will turn to the case of small search friction (large discount factor
±). For any equilibrium pro¯le e ´ fxt; U bt ; U st g1t=0, we de¯ne the following
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set:
L(e) ´ ft 2 f0; 1; 2:::g j xt < 1g: (7)
L(e) is the set of the periods in which matched sellers choose the minimum
investment, zero, with some positive probability.
Then we show the following result which has the di®erent feature from
the case of large search friction.
Proposition 2. Suppose that ± 2 (±¤; 1). Then in any equilibrium e the
minimum investment level, zero, must be chosen with positive probability for
in¯nitely many times, i.e.,
supL(e) = +1:
Proof. See Appendix.
Given an equilibrium e, we also de¯ne the following set:
D(e) ´ ft 2 f0; 1; 2; :::g j trade does not occur with positive probability in period t.g:
Then the direct corollary from Proposition 2 is the following:
Corollary. Suppose that ± 2 (±¤; 1). Then in any equilibrium e trade must
be delayed with positive probability for in¯nitely many times, i.e.,
supD(e) = +1:
Proof. By Proposition 2 we know that xt < 1 must happen for in¯nitely
many times when ± 2 (±¤; 1). Then, by Lemma 2, since trade does not
occur when a = 0 was realized, no{trade outcome must happen with positive
probability for in¯nitely many times as well. Q.E.D.
The intuition behind these results can be explained as follows: If there
exists some equilibrium in which the minimum investment a = 0 is chosen
with positive probability only for ¯nite times, then by Lemma 1 the equi-
librium investment must coincide with the static equilibrium one as with
probability one from some period T onward. However, if at = as for all
t ¸ T , the sum of the reservation values of a buyer and a seller at period T
must be stationary and equal to
U bT + U
s
T =
±®S(as)
1¡ ±(1¡ ®) :
This is because the total surplus S(as) will be realized in every match from
period T onward. Since each matched seller can obtain at least U sT by
choosing a = 0, the following inequality must be satis¯ed for each seller to
choose as:
¯fv(as)¡ U bT ¡ U sT g+ U sT ¡ c(as) ¸ U sT ;
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which is reduced to
¯
½
v(as)¡ ±®S(a
s)
1¡ ±(1¡ ®)
¾
¡ c(as) ¸ 0:
However this inequality is not satis¯ed when ± > ±¤. Thus each matched
seller deviates and chooses a = 0 with certainty, which gives him the higher
payo® U sT than the equilibrium payo® obtained by choosing a
s. Hence the
minimum investment a = 0 must be chosen with positive probability for
in¯nitely many times in any equilibrium. Then by Lemma 2 trade must be
delayed with positive probability for in¯nitely many times as well.
We can also relate this result to the literature about delay in bargaining
games. Our above result sheds a new light on equilibrium delay in the
view point of the holdup problem and search friction. The key factor to
cause delay in our model is that the trade value v(a) is endogenous and it is
a®ected by matched seller's investment a 2 A. This is the main di®erence
from the standard bargaining games which have mostly assumed that trade
surplus is exogenous.
When trade value is endogenous, players' expectation about the future
investment decisions plays the important role: If they expect the future
sellers will invest much and hence the future trade values will be high, the
reservation values of buyer and seller U bt and U
s
t become high as well. Then
the current negotiation surplus v(a)¡U bt ¡U st becomes small so that current
sellers invest little, which then leads to no{trade outcome in the current
match. On the other hand, if players expect the future sellers will invest
little, then the current net negotiation surplus becomes high and hence the
current sellers invest much, which leads to trade. This argument shows that
in any equilibrium there must exist both the event in which investment is
low and trade is not realized and the event in which investment is high and
trade occurs with non{trivial probabilities. By this reason, delay of trade
occurs with some positive probability in our model.
Next we will focus on some particular equilibrium which possesses the
feature of low investment and delayed trade as identi¯ed in Proposition 2.
We can show that there are many equilibria which exhibit this feature for
some large discount factors.
Proposition 3. Suppose that ± 2 (±¤; 1). Then there exists a unique station-
ary equilibrium in which every matched seller chooses the static investment
as and the minimum one, zero, with probabilities x¤ 2 (0; 1) and 1 ¡ x¤
respectively in every period where x¤ satis¯es
v(as)¡ c(as)=¯ = ®±x
¤S(as)
1¡ ±(1¡ ®x¤) :
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Proof. Suppose that the sum of the reservation values U b and U s is given
by
U b + U s =
®±x¤S(as)
1¡ ±(1¡ ®x¤) :
Note here that v(as) > U b + U s > v(0) by Assumption 1. Also, such
x¤ 2 (0; 1) is uniquely determined.
Then every matched seller is indi®erent for choosing as and zero because
¯fv(as)¡ U b ¡ U sg+ U s ¡ c(as) = U s:
Thus we can suppose that each matched seller randomizes his investment
choice by putting the probability x¤ 2 (0; 1) on a = as and the probability
1¡ x¤ on a = 0 respectively. Also, such sellers's behavior can be consistent
with the sum of the reservation values U b and U s we have de¯ned above.
Q.E.D.
When equilibrium is stationary in that every matched seller follows the
same investment strategy in every period, it must be unique and involve the
mixed strategy of seller's investment choice randomizing between as and
zero.
We can also show that there exist non{stationary equilibria as well.
Proposition 4. For any positive integer K ¸ 1, there exist some ±K and
±K such that for all ± 2 (±K ; ±K) a non{stationary equilibrium arises where
each matched seller chooses equilibrium investment at in period t as follows:
at =
8<:
as for t = ¿K + ¿ ¡ 1 (¿ = 1; 2; :::);
0 otherwise
Proof. See Appendix.
The equilibrium shown in Proposition 4 is non{stationary in the sense
that equilibrium investments of matched sellers cyclically change over time.
Following the matched sellers' investment as in some period, equilibrium
investments become zero and hence trades are not realized in all subsequent
K periods. In the next period sellers' investment will be returned back to
the static equilibrium one as again, which leads to trade agreements for all
matches in that period. Thus equilibrium investment and trade have cyclical
patterns with period K.
Also, if there exists a non{stationary equilibrium with period K cycle for
some range of discount factors, then there also exist non{stationary equi-
libria with cycle k (k · K ¡ 1) for the same range of the parameters of
the model as well. This is because we have (±K ; ±K) ½ (±K¡1; ±K¡1): If
we have ± 2 (±K ; ±K) such that a period K cycle equilibrium exists, then
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± 2 (±K¡1; ±K¡1) and hence period K ¡ 1 cycle equilibrium also exists as
well.
Proposition 3 and 4 show that there exist multiple equilibria even for
the same levels of market friction (± 2 (0; 1)). The next natural question is
what equilibrium can attain the highest e±ciency in the market among all
possible equilibria. We will now explore this issue.
4.2 Welfare Analysis
In this subsection we will conduct the welfare analysis about how the change
of search friction a®ects the equilibrium outcomes and hence the market
welfare.
We de¯ne the social welfare of the search market as the discounted
present value of the sum of buyers' and sellers' payo®s evaluated at ini-
tial period t = 0. Then, given an equilibrium path e ´ fft; U bt ; U st g1t=0, we
can derive the social welfare under this equilibrium e for a given ± 2 [0; 1)
as follows:
W (±je) ´ ®maxfEf0 [S(a)]; U b0 + U s0g+ (1¡ ®)(U b0 + U s0 ) (8)
where
U bt+U
s
t = ±f®maxfEft+1 [S(a)]; U bt+1+U st+1g+(1¡®)(U bt+1+U st+1)g; t = 0; 1; 2; :::
(9)
Note here that the ex ante surplus in period t is given by maxfEft [S(a)]; U bt+
U st g because every matched pair will be dissolved and will obtain their reser-
vation values when the net ex ante surplus Eft [S(a)]¡U bt ¡U st is negative.
By using Lemma 1 and 2, we know that in any equilibrium each matched
seller chooses as with probability xt 2 [0; 1] only in which case trade occurs
and the trade value S(as) is realized. In all other cases trade values are never
realized. By using this fact, we can rewrite the social welfare as follows:
W (±je) = ®x0S(as) + (1¡ ®x0)(U b0 + U s0 ); (10)
where
U bt + U
s
t = ±f®xt+1S(as) + (1¡ ®xt+1)(U bt+1 + U st+1)g; t = 0; 1; 2; ::: (11)
Then we give the following de¯nition.
De¯nition. An equilibrium e = fxt; U bt ; U st g1t=0 is said to be constrained
e±cient if it attains the highest social welfare among all possible equilibria.
Otherwise, it is said to be ine±cient.
We ¯rst show the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Consider a sequence e^ = fx^t; U^ bt ; U^ st g1t=0 satisfying the following:
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(i) t = 0: x^0 = 1.
(ii) 8 t ¸ 1: x^t = x¤ 2 [0; 1] where x¤ = 1 if ± 2 (0; ±¤) and x¤ 2 [0; 1]
satis¯es
¯
½
v(as)¡ ±®x
¤S(as)
1¡ ±(1¡ ®x¤)
¾
= c(as)
if ± 2 (±¤; 1).
(iii) The reservation values:
U^ bt + U^
s
t =
®x¤S(as)
1¡ ±(1¡ ®x¤) ; t = 0; 1; 2; :::
Then e^ can be an equilibrium.
Proof. Since x¤ = 1 for all ± 2 (0; ±¤), e^ coincides with the unique static
equilibrium shown in Proposition 1 for any ± 2 (0; ±¤).
Next suppose that ± 2 (±¤; 1). Then, given U^ bt and U^ st above, each
matched seller faces the following payo® function in period t:
uS(a) = ¯max
½
v(a)¡ ±®x
¤S(as)
1¡ ±(1¡ ®x¤) ; 0
¾
+ U^ st ¡ c(a):
Then, by de¯nition of x¤, maxa2A uS(a) = uS(0) = uS(as). Thus each
matched seller is willing to randomize between a = as and a = 0 with
probabilities x¤ and 1 ¡ x¤ respectively in any period t ¸ 1. Also it is
optimal for each matched seller to choose as with certainty (x^0 = 1) in
initial period t = 0.
Note that when as was realized trade occurs because v(as) > U^ bt + U^
s
t
for any t while when a = 0 was realized trade never happens because v(0) <
v(as) ¡ c(as)=¯ = U^ bt + U^ st for any t. Thus trade occurs with probability
x¤ per match and hence the surplus S(as) is realized only with probability
®x¤. Thus the above seller's strategy leads to the reservation values U^ bt + U^ st
de¯ned above. Q.E.D.
Then we show the following result.
Proposition 5. The equilibrium e^ shown in Lemma 3 is constrained e±-
cient.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 5 can be explained as follows: First,
as we have shown, every matched seller chooses either the static equilibrium
investment as or the minimum one, zero, in any equilibrium. In particular
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each matched seller chooses as in period t if and only if (IC) is satis¯ed as we
have noted. Then (IC) shows that the discounted present value of the total
future payo®s of a buyer and a seller in the market from period t+1 onward
(which is evaluated at period t), i.e., U bt + U
s
t , is bounded from above by
v(as) ¡ c(as)=¯. The equilibrium identi¯ed in Lemma 3, e^, can attain this
upper bound and implement the highest investment incentive of matched
sellers while keeping (IC)s hold as equalities in any period t.
From Proposition 5 we can derive the interesting implication about the
e±ciency property of the search market. Proposition 5 shows that the social
welfare in the constrained e±cient equilibrium e^ is given by
W (±je^) ´ ®S(as) + (1¡ ®) ±®x
¤S(as)
1¡ ±(1¡ ®x¤) ; (12)
where x¤ = 1 for all ± 2 (0; ±¤) and x¤ satis¯es v(as)¡ c(as)=¯ = ±®x¤S(as)1¡±(1¡®x¤)
for ± 2 [±¤; 1) respectively. Note here that W (±je^) is increasing in ± 2 (0; ±¤)
but constant atW (±je^) = ®S(as)+(1¡®)[v(as)¡c(as)=¯] over all ± 2 [±¤; 1).
We take any ine±cient equilibrium e 6= e^ and consider its welfare, de-
noted by W (±je). Then, since W (±je^) is constant over all ± 2 (±¤; 1) and
W (±je) = W (±je^) for all ± 2 (0; ±¤) due to Proposition 1, the social welfare
in any ine±cient equilibrium W (±je) must be non{monotonic with respect
to the discount factor ±. This is because W (±je) must be strictly less than
W (±je^) for some higher discount factors than ±¤.
For example, we ¯rst consider the stationary equilibrium identi¯ed in
Proposition 3. Let es = fx¤; U b; U sg denote this unique stationary equilib-
rium. Then the social welfare in the stationary equilibrium is given by
W (±jes) ´ ®x¤S(as) + (1¡ ®x¤) ±®x
¤S(as)
1¡ ±(1¡ ®x¤)
where note that trade will occur and hence the total surplus S(as) will be
realized only when matched sellers choose the static equilibrium investment
as which occurs with probability x¤ 2 [0; 1]. By Proposition 1 we know
that x¤ = 1 when ± 2 [0; ±¤]. However, by Proposition 3 we have x¤ < 1
when ± > ±¤. Note that in such case x¤ is decreasing in ±. Also, since
±®x¤S(as)
1¡±(1¡®x¤) = v(a
s)¡ c(as)=¯ for all ± 2 (±¤; 1), we can rewrite W (±jes) as
W (±jes) = ®x¤S(as) + (1¡ ®x¤)[v(as)¡ c(as)=¯]
for ± 2 (±¤; 1). Thus, as shown in Figure 1, the social welfare W (±jes) in the
stationary equilibrium is non{monotonic with respect to the discount factor
±: Smaller market friction reduces the social e±ciency.
Second, we consider the non{stationary equilibria characterized in Propo-
sition 4: We have the non{stationary equilibrium with period K cycle, de-
noted ens, for ± 2 (±K ; ±K). Then the social welfare in the non{stationary
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equilibrium ens, denoted W (±jens), must be strictly less than that in the
constrained e±cient equilibrium W (±je^). This is because
W (±jens) = ±K¡1fU bK + U sKg
· ±K¡1fv(as)¡ c(as)=¯g
< v(as)¡ c(as)=¯
< ®S(as) + (1¡ ®)fv(as)¡ c(as)=¯g
= W (±je^)
where the ¯rst inequality follows from the fact that all matched sellers choose
a = 0 and trades are not realized until period K in which v(as)¡ c(as)=¯ ¸
U bK +U
s
K holds so that the matched sellers choose a
s, the second inequality
from ± < 1 and K ¸ 2 and the ¯nal inequality from S(as) > v(as)¡ c(as)=¯
respectively. Thus, as shown in Figure 2, non{stationary equilibrium ens
may arise for ± 2 (±K ; ±K) even when we have the constrained e±cient
equilibrium e^ for all other discount factors. In such case the social welfare
is not monotonic with respect to the discount factor ±. Again, small search
cost has the adverse e®ect on the market e±ciency.
Next we will extend the basic model in the several directions.
5 Extensions
5.1 Heterogeneous Agents
In this subsection we will allow buyers and sellers to be heterogeneous. Let
µit 2 £ and Ãjt 2 ª be the random variables, called \types," which a®ect
the valuation of buyer i and investment cost of seller j in period t. We
denote by v(a; µ) the trade value which depends on the buyer's current type
µ. We also denote by c(a; Ã) the seller's investment cost which depends on
the seller's current type Ã. At the beginning of each period every buyer and
seller do not know their own types in that period. After matching, the types
of matched buyer and seller, µt and Ãt, are realized according to some prob-
ability distributions and are then known to them. We assume that any type
pair (µ; Ã) has positive measure. The realized types are common knowledge
for matched players but the types of future players will be changed. We also
assume that the probability distributions from which µt and Ãt are drawn
are independent of time index t and that any type of any player is replaced
by a new entrant with the same type when he or she leaves the market.
These assumptions can ensure that the distributions of types can be kept
constant over time.
Suppose that in period t buyer i and seller j matched and observed their
realized types as µ and Ã respectively. Given these types, in period t the
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seller will obtain the following payo®:
¯maxfv(a; µ)¡ U bt ¡ U st ; 0g+ U st ¡ c(a; Ã) (13)
where the sum of the reservation values U bt and U
s
t are given by
U bt + U
s
t = ±f®Eµ;Ã[v(at+1; µ)¡ c(at+1; Ã)] + (1¡ ®)(U bt+1 + U st+1)g: (14)
Here Eµ;Ã[¢] denotes expectation operator with respect to the types of buyers
and sellers (µ; Ã).
Matched seller of type Ã chooses his investment level at to maximize his
expected payo® (13), given the reservation values U bt and U
s
t . By using a
similar argument to Lemma 1, we can show that the optimal investment
choice by each matched seller becomes a = 0 or a = as(µ; Ã) where
as(µ; Ã) ´ argmax
a2A
¯v(a; µ)¡ c(a; Ã):
Also, we can show that trade will occur when the seller chooses as(µ; Ã)
again. Then let xt(µ; Ã) 2 [0; 1] denote the equilibrium probability that seller
of type Ã chooses as(µ; Ã) when he matches with buyer of type µ in period t.
xt(µ; Ã) also means the probability of trade in period t when buyer of type µ
and seller of type s match with each other. Let xt ´ (xt(µ; Ã))(µ;Ã)2££ª be
a collection of possible trade probabilities in period t. Then we can de¯ne
an equilibrium as a path e ´ fxt; U bt ; U st g1t=0 as before.
For a given equilibrium e, we de¯ne the following set:
~L(e) ´ ft = 0; 1; 2::: j xt(µ; Ã) < 1 for some (µ; Ã) 2 ££ªg:
~L(e) is the set of the periods in which trades do not occur with some positive
probabilities according to equilibrium e. Then we can extend our ine±ciency
result (Proposition 2) to the case of heterogeneous agents:
Proposition 6. There exists some ± 2 (0; 1) such that for all ± 2 (±; 1) we
have sup~L(e) = +1 in any equilibrium e.
Proof. See Appendix.
5.2 Ex Ante Contracts
We have so far assumed that matched parties cannot write ex ante contracts
at all before investment choice because trade decision is assumed to be not
contractible ex ante. In this subsection we will assume that it is ex ante
veri¯able whether or not trade is realized. Thus matched parties can write
ex ante contract contingent on trade outcome before sellers make speci¯c
investments.
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Since ex ante contract is introduced, one might think that the ine±ciency
identi¯ed in the previous sections can be reduced. However, we will show
that this is not always the case and rather the market outcome may be less
e±cient when ex ante contracts are possible than when they are not at all.
This implies that enlarging the set of contract space may not improve the
market e±ciency when the market is more competitive in the sense that
search cost is so small.9
To keep consistency of all our assumptions, we also assume that each
matched pair of a buyer and a seller can verify whether or not they actually
traded the good in their current match but each of them cannot know the
past history of his or her matched partner such as whether he or she has
matched but has not traded the goods in past periods. 10
We also assume away the message games which use the messages sent
by the parties and make the trade decision and payment contingent on
them. The message game is more general mechanism than the simple non{
contingent contract which speci¯es only ¯xed payments. However, since our
main purpose here is to show the possibility that ex ante contracting may
make the market e±ciency worse, it su±ces to focus on the simple case that
message games are ruled out: Our result shows at least that expanding the
set of possible contracts does not always improve the market e±ciency.
Now, since at the beginning of each period ex ante contracts are possible
contingent on trade outcome, in period t matched parties can write an ex
ante contract fP 1t ; P 0t g where P 1t (P 0t ) denotes the payment made from the
buyer to the seller when the good is (not) traded.
Recall that the buyer's valuation of the good is given by b(a) and the
seller's production cost by d(a). Here we assume that d(a) represents the
personal disutility seller incurs for delivering the good to buyer as well as
c(a) is the personal disutility of investment. We also assume that both b
and d are increasing and positive for all a 2 A. In the previous sections the
total trade value v(a) = b(a) ¡ d(a) matters for the equilibrium outcome.
On the other hand, once we handle the case of ex ante contracts, we need
to make these notations b(a) and d(e) explicitly.
We make the following assumptions:
Assumption 2. (i) Each matched buyer has the full bargaining power to
make an o®er of ex ante contract to matched seller. (ii) Each seller has
9We may be able to connect this result to the literature about price discrimination
among competing ¯rms, which has discussed the e®ects of enlarging the instruments of
¯rms' pricing policies on industry pro¯ts, consumer surplus and social welfare. In some
cases welfare may become lower when more instruments are available for ¯rms. See Arm-
strong (2006) for the survey on related topics.
10If matched parties can observe their past history, they can may make their current
strategies contingent on the observed past history of trade outcomes. This is not consistent
with the assumption of anonymous market.
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no wealth. (iii) A = [0; a]. (iv) b, d and c are all continuous. (v) S(a) is
increasing in a 2 [0; as].
Assumption 2(i) says that ex ante contract is o®ered by a matched buyer
to a matched seller in the take{it{or{leave{it fashion. One reason for why
buyer has full bargaining power ex ante but not ex post might be that, since
seller's investment is match speci¯c and indispensable for trade, the seller has
some bargaining power ex post after investment was made. Assumption 2(ii)
requires that any payment made from buyer to seller must be non{negative,
P it ¸ 0 for i = 0; 1 and all t. We can readily show that any equilibrium
attains the ¯rst best outcome when sellers are not wealth constrained (See
the Remark below). Thus the limited liability of sellers will play the role of
making equilibrium comparison meaningful. Assumption 2(iii) and (iv) say
that seller chooses continuous investment which continuously a®ects both
the buyer's value b and seller's disutility of delivery d. Finally Assumption
2(v) is satis¯ed when S is a concave function because as is not higher than
the ¯rst best investment which maximizes S(a) over A.
Since contracts are incomplete and sellers are subject to limited liability,
by Assumption 2 we are concerned with the situations in which contract
enforcement is limited and severe as in emerging markets.
The timing of events in a period is changed as follows:
date 0 Matched buyer o®ers an ex ante contract fP 1t ; P 0t g to a matched seller
where P it ¸ 0 for i = 0; 1. Then the seller decides whether or not to
accept it. If he rejects it, the parties obtain their reservation values
U bt and U
s
t .
date 1 The seller makes speci¯c investment a 2 A. This is observed to both
parties.
date 1.5 With probability ¯ 2 (0; 1), the seller makes a renegotiation contract
o®er to the buyer while with probability 1 ¡ ¯ the buyer makes a
renegotiation contract o®er to the seller. If the parties agree on rene-
gotiation contract, this will be in force. Otherwise, the ex ante contract
will be in force.
date 2 Trade decision and payments are made according to binding contract
(ex ante or renegotiated one).
Given an ex ante contract fP 1t ; P 0t g, matched parties agree on trade of
the good if and only if the following voluntary trade conditions are satis¯ed
(Hart and Moore (1988)):
b(a)¡ P 1t ¸ ¡P 0t + U bt ; (15)
for buyer and
P 1t ¡ d(a) ¸ P 0t + U st (16)
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for seller respectively.
Inequality (15) says that the buyer's payo® from trade under the ex ante
contract (the left hand side) is not less than her payo® from no{trade under
the ex ante contract (the right hand side). Inequality (16) has a similar
meaning for the seller.
If these conditions are satis¯ed, then the matched parties agree on trade
under ex ante contract fP 1t ; P 0t g. Thus they can avoid renegotiation in
such case. If these inequalities are not satis¯ed, no{trade outcome becomes
status quo and hence they always renegotiate ex ante contract when ex post
surplus from trade is positive. However, in the presence of seller's limited
liability, renegotiation may fail even when ex post surplus v(a) ¡ U bt ¡ U st
is positive. The seller makes a renegotiation payment o®er R ¸ 0 to ensure
that the buyer accepts it, i.e., b(a) ¡ R ¸ P 0t + U bt . If b(a) ¡ P 0t ¡ U bt < 0
holds no such R ¸ 0 exists to satisfy the seller's limited liability constraint.
Thus in that case trade will not occur and the buyer and seller will obtain
the payo®s ¡P 0t + U bt and P 0t + U st respectively. On the other hand, when
the buyer makes a renegotiation o®er R ¸ 0, the limited liability constraint
of seller is never binding because the seller's acceptance condition requires
R¡ d(a) ¸ P 0t + U st which yields R ¸ d(a) + P 0t + U st ¸ 0.
Remark. The limited liability imposed on sellers plays the important role
here. Without the limited liability constraint, in any equilibrium the ¯rst
best outcome can be attained under some mild conditions once we introduce
ex ante contracts (See Appendix).
Now the seller's payo® resulting from renegotiation (net of investment
disutility c(a)) can be written by
ust (a) =
8<:
¯maxfv(a)¡ U bt ¡ U st ; 0g+ U st + P 0t ¡ c(a) if b(a) ¸ P 0t + U bt ;
U st + P
0
t ¡ c(a) otherwise
(17)
We de¯ne the cost minimizing investment, denoted am, as follows:
am ´ argmin
a2A
d(a) + c(a); (18)
which minimizes the total disutility of seller, delivery and investment disutil-
ities d(a) and c(a). We assume that am is unique and satis¯es the following:
Assumption 3. S(am) > v(as)¡ c(as)=¯.
Assumption 3 says that the seller's bargaining power ¯ is not so large
relative to the ex ante surplus S(am) attained by the cost minimizing in-
vestment am.
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We also de¯ne the ex ante contract, denoted C¤ = fP 1; P 0g, which
implements the cost minimizing investment of seller am at the minimum
payment of buyer:
P 1 = d(am) + c(am); P 0 = 0:
We will call this C¤ the cost minimizing contract.
Then we show the following result.
Proposition 7. Suppose that matched parties can write ex ante contract
contingent on trade outcome after matching but before sellers' investments
and that Assumption 1{3 hold. Then, for small search friction (large ±),
there exists a stationary equilibrium in which every matched buyer o®ers
the cost minimizing contract C¤ and every matched seller chooses the cost
minimizing investment am with certainty in every period.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 7 is as follows: Suppose that the reser-
vation values of buyer and seller are stationary and given by
U
b =
±®S(am)
1¡ ±(1¡ ®) ; U
s = 0:
Suppose also that every matched buyer o®ers the cost minimizing contract
C¤ to her matched seller. Then, if the seller accepts this contract and
chooses the cost minimizing investment am, the buyer will obtain the payo®
b(am) ¡ P 1 = S(am) while the seller will obtain the payo® equal to P 1 ¡
d(am) ¡ c(am) = 0. This can be a stationary equilibrium. Thus we have
to show two things for large ± 2 (0; 1): First, every matched seller has the
incentive to choose am, given the contract C¤ and the above reservation
values U b and U s. Second, every matched buyer has no incentives to o®er
other contracts than C¤, given these reservation values.
First, given the contract C¤, if some matched seller deviates to choose
a 6= am, then he can be better o® only when renegotiation of C¤ will happen
(because otherwise he will end up obtaining P 1¡ d(a)¡ c(a) but this is less
than the payo® P 1 ¡ d(am) ¡ c(am) = 0 by choosing a = am). However,
under renegotiation the seller's payo® is at most ¯maxfv(a)¡U b¡U s; 0g+
U
s¡ c(a) which is less than U s = 0 by choosing a = 0 because small friction
(large ±) makes the reservation values large so that U b + U s ! S(am) >
v(as)¡c(as)=¯ due to Assumption 3. Thus when the search friction is small
enough every matched seller chooses am with certainty in order to avoid
renegotiation of the contract C¤.
Second, can some buyer improve her payo® by o®ering other contracts
than C¤? Answer is No. This is because every matched buyer can implement
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only the cost minimizing investment am by o®ering ex ante contract: If
renegotiation occurs under ex ante contract fP 1; P 0g, this does not result
in higher payo® of the buyer than S(am). The reason for this is that when
renegotiation happens the buyer will obtain the payo® (1 ¡ ¯)maxfv(a) ¡
U
b ¡ U s; 0g + U b which is however less than U b because when ± is large
enough the seller will choose a = 0 under renegotiation as we have seen
above. Thus, if the buyer can be better o® by ex ante contract, it must be
the case that the voluntary trade conditions hold and hence renegotiation
is avoided. For example suppose that the seller chooses a 6= am. Then the
seller's payo® becomes P 1 ¡ d(a)¡ c(a) when renegotiation is avoided. We
can then show that the voluntary trade conditions must be satis¯ed with
strict inequalities due to the seller's limited liability. If the voluntary trade
condition for the buyer b(a)¡P 1 ¸ ¡P 0+U b holds as equality, her payo® is
¡P 0 +U b which is not higher than her reservation value U b due to P 0 ¸ 0.
If the voluntary trade condition for the seller P 1 ¡ d(a) ¸ P 0 +U s holds as
equality, then his payo® is P 0+U s¡c(a) which is less than the payo® attained
by slightly reducing the investment to a0 (a0 < a) and inducing renegotiation,
¯maxfv(a0)¡U b ¡U s; 0g+U s + P 0 ¡ c(a0) for a0 < a. Thus the voluntary
trade conditions must hold with strict inequalities both for the buyer and
the seller. However, then the seller can slightly change his investment from
a to some a00 towards am and obtain higher payo® P 1¡d(a00)¡c(a00) as long
as a 6= am. This argument shows that the buyer can implement the cost
minimizing investment am and hence obtain at most S(am) by o®ering ex
ante contract.
One important implication of Proposition 7 is that the equilibrium when
ex ante contracts are possible may be less e±cient than the equilibrium when
no ex ante contracts are possible. Next we will explore this issue.
First note that Proposition 5 still remains true even when we introduce
the limited liability constraint of sellers: Suppose that no ex ante contracts
are possible. Then the seller's limited liability constraint results in failure of
renegotiation only if b(a) < U bt , even when the ex post surplus v(a)¡U bt ¡U st
is positive. However, since in the constrained e±cient equilibrium we have
b(as) > v(as) > U b + U s = ±®x
¤S(as)
1¡±(1¡®x¤) and hence b(a
s) > U bt , the limited
liability constraint is never binding in the constrained e±cient equilibrium
identi¯ed in Proposition 5.
Now we investigate the e®ects of ex ante contracts on market e±ciency.
We compare the social welfare attained in the equilibrium when ex ante
contracts are possible with that attained in the equilibrium when they are
not. In particular we consider the equilibrium shown in Proposition 7, which
we will call contract equilibrium, and the equilibrium shown in Lemma 3,
which we will call no{contract equilibrium. Recall here that the no{contract
equilibrium is constrained e±cient among all possible equilibria when no
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ex ante contracts are written at all (Proposition 5). One might think that
our comparison between these equilibria is arbitrary because we will rule
out other equilibria. However, since our purpose is to demonstrate the
possibility that ine±ciency of the markets with small friction becomes more
severe when ex ante contracts are introduced than when they are not, it
is su±cient to show that there exists at least one such equilibrium with ex
ante contracts which is less e±cient than some equilibrium without ex ante
contracts.
By Proposition 7, the social welfare attained in contract equilibrium is
given by
W c(®; ±) ´ ®S(a
m)
1¡ ±(1¡ ®) ; (19)
when the discount factor ± is large because all matched sellers choose the
cost minimizing investment am with certainty in all periods.
On the other hand, the social welfare in no{contract equilibrium was
de¯ned as W (±je^) (see (12)). To make the dependence of W (±je^) on both ±
and ® explicit, we can rewrite this as:
Wn(®; ±) ´ ®S(as) + (1¡ ®) ±®x
¤S(as)
1¡ ±(1¡ ®x¤) (20)
where x¤ 2 [0; 1] satis¯es ±®x¤S(as)1¡±(1¡®x¤) = v(as) ¡ c(as)=¯ for ± 2 (±¤; 1) and
x¤ = 1 for all ± 2 (0; ±¤).
We make the following assumption:
Assumption 4. as > am.
Then the direct comparison between W c(®; ±) and Wn(®; ±) yields the
following result:
Proposition 8. Suppose that Assumption 1{4 hold. Suppose also that the
search friction measured by both ® and ± is small, i.e., ® and ± are close
to one. Then no{contract equilibrium can attain higher social welfare than
contract equilibrium, i.e., Wn(®; ±) > W c(®; ±).
Proof. When ± tends to be close to one, we have W c(®; ±)! S(am) while
Wn(®; ±)! ®S(as) + (1¡ ®)[v(as)¡ c(as)=¯]
which is close to S(as) when ®! 1.
By Assumption 2(v) S is increasing over [0; as] and hence we have S(as) >
S(am) due to Assumption 4. Q.E.D.
For Proposition 8 to be meaningful, Assumption 4 must be consistent
with Assumption 3. We can give an example to ensure this as follows:
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Example. Assume that A = [0; 1], b(a) = 1 + (1 ¡ ½)a, d(a) = 1 ¡ ½a and
c(a) = (1=2)a2 where ½ 2 (0; ¯). Thus v(a) = a. In this quadratic example
we can show that as = ¯, am = ½, S(am) = ½(1¡ (1=2)½), v(as)¡ c(as)=¯ =
(1=2)¯ and S(as) = ¯(1 ¡ (1=2)¯). Thus we have as = ¯ > am = ½ which
satis¯es Assumption 4. Also, when 1=2 > ¯, we have S(am) > v(as) ¡
c(as)=¯ for all ½ 2 (0; ¯) which satis¯es Assumption 3.
Proposition 8 shows that introduction of ex ante contracts does not miti-
gate the holdup ine±ciency caused by small market friction but rather exag-
gerates such ine±ciency. In fact enlarging the set of available contracts may
make the market e±ciency worse than the case of limited contracts. Thus
this might imply that it is not optimal policy to make markets competitive
in developing countries with limited contract enforcement.
5.3 Two{Sided Investment
In this subsection we will extend the basic model to allow both matched
buyers and sellers to make speci¯c investments. One might think that, if
matched buyers also make non{contractible investment as well as sellers do,
it becomes more di±cult to improve e±ciency. However, this argument is not
true in the dynamic search market model we are considering here. Surpris-
ingly, we show that in completely symmetric case the two{sided investment
may help recover e±ciency when the ine±ciency identi¯ed in Proposition 2
arises in the case of one{sided investment.
To see this, consider the following example:
Example 1. Consider the symmetric and two{sided investment case: Each
matched buyer chooses match speci¯c investment aB 2 f0; 1g as well as each
matched seller does so aS 2 f0; 1g. Party i (i = B;S) incurs the investment
cost cai where c > 0. Also each party has the same ex post bargaining
power ¯ = 1=2. Let v(aB; aS) be the trade value of the good and assume
that v(¢; ¢) is increasing and
S¤ ´ v(1; 1)¡ 2c > v(1; 0) = v(0; 1):
This also implies that it is the ¯rst best optimal to implement high in-
vestments aB = aS = 1 from both parties because we have v(1; 1) ¡ 2c >
v(0; 1)¡ c and v(1; 1)¡ 2c > v(0; 0). Also assume S¤ > 0.
Then we can show that there exists an equilibrium which implements the
¯rst best e±ciency when the search friction tends to be small (± ! 1), even
though this is not the case when only one party of matched pair invests.
To see this result, ¯rst consider the case of one{sided investment. Then
suppose that ± is so high that there exist no equilibria in which every
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matched investing party chooses high investment with probability one as
shown by Proposition 2.
Now we consider the two{sided investment case that both parties of each
match choose investments, ai 2 f0; 1g, i = B;S. Then we will show that
there exists a stationary equilibrium in which every matched party chooses
high investment aB = aS = 1 with probability one.
To see this, suppose that the reservation values U¤B and U
¤
S are given as
follows:
U¤B + U
¤
S =
±®S¤
1¡ ±(1¡ ®) :
Then consider the investment incentive of one party of a matched pair, say
i, given the other party choosing high investment aj = 1. If i chooses ai = 1
as well, then he obtains the payo®:
1
2
fv(1; 1)¡ U¤B ¡ U¤Sg+ U¤i ¡ c:
Here the ex post surplus v(1; 1)¡U¤B¡U¤S is always positive for all ± 2 (0; 1).
On the other hand, if i chooses ai = 0, then he can obtain the following
payo®:
1
2
maxfv(0; 1)¡ U¤B ¡ U¤S ; 0g+ U¤i :
Then, since v(1; 1)¡2c > v(0; 1) and de¯nition of U¤B+U¤S , the term v(0; 1)¡
U¤B ¡ U¤S converges to v(0; 1) ¡ [v(1; 1) ¡ 2c] < 0 as ± ! 1. Thus ex post
surplus is negative, which shows that i's payo® becomes U¤i by choosing
ai = 0. In particular, there exists some ± 2 (0; 1) such that for all ± 2 (±; 1)
we have v(0; 1)¡U¤B¡U¤S < 0. Thus party i chooses ai = 1 for all ± 2 (±; 1),
if the following inequality is satis¯ed
1
2
fv(1; 1)¡ U¤B ¡ U¤Sg+ U¤i ¡ c ¸ U¤i ; i = B;S:
In fact we derive
1
2
fv(1; 1)¡ U¤B ¡ U¤Sg ¡ c
=
1
2
½
v(1; 1)¡ ±®[v(1; 1)¡ 2c]
1¡ ±(1¡ ®)
¾
¡ c
>
1
2
fv(1; 1)¡ [v(1; 1)¡ 2c]g ¡ c
=
1
2
2c¡ c
= 0:
Thus there exists a stationary equilibrium in which all matched parties
choose the ¯rst best investment aB = aS = 1, given their reservation values
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U¤B and U
¤
S where U
¤
B + U
¤
S =
±®S¤
1¡±(1¡®) .
However, this result depends on the assumption that both buyers and
sellers have the same investment cost as well as the same bargaining power.
In fact we can show that, when buyers and sellers are heterogeneous with
respect to their investment costs and bargaining powers, the ine±ciency
result shown in Proposition 2 still appears. More precisely, we show that
there generically exist no equilibria in which both matched buyer and seller
choose high investments (aB = as = 1) with probability one.
To see this, consider the following example:
Example 2. We modify Example 1 as follows: The buyer's cost of choosing
high investment cB di®ers from the seller's cost cS (cB 6= cS).
Then the following incentive compatibility constraints must be satis¯ed
if there exists a stationary equilibrium in which every matched pair chooses
high investment aB = aS = 1 (¯rst best investment) with probability one:
¯fv(1; 1)¡ U¤B ¡ U¤Sg+ U¤S ¡ cS ¸ U¤S
and
(1¡ ¯)fv(1; 1)¡ U¤B ¡ U¤Sg+ U¤B ¡ cB ¸ U¤B
where U¤i denotes the equilibrium reservation value of party i = B;S. The
reason why the above inequalities must hold is that each matched party can
choose low investment (ai = 0) and ensure at least the reservation value U¤i
by himself.
Also the equilibrium reservation values U¤B and U
¤
S must satisfy
U¤B + U
¤
S =
±®[v(1; 1)¡ cB ¡ cS ]
1¡ ±(1¡ ®) :
Let ± ! 1. Then the above inequalities can be written by
¯(cB + cS) ¸ cS
and
(1¡ ¯)(cB + cS) ¸ cB:
Since these inequalities must hold as equalities, we must have
1¡ ¯
¯
=
cB
cS
:
However, a small perturbation of the parameter values violates this equality,
which shows that there generically exist no equilibria in which both matched
buyer and seller choose high investments (the ¯rst best investment) with
probability one.
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Example 2 shows that the ine±ciency result shown by Proposition 2
appears again even when both parties of matched pair make speci¯c invest-
ments, if a slight perturbation of the parameters breaks exact symmetry
between buyers and sellers. In this sense our ine±ciency result shown in
Proposition 2 is generically robust even when both parties of matched pair
make speci¯c investments.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the holdup problem in the search market
in which many buyers and sellers search for trading partners and speci¯c in-
vestments are made before trade but after match. Then we have shown that
the holdup problem imposes more serious ine±ciency when search friction
becomes smaller: When search friction tends to be small, equilibrium invest-
ment is dropped down to zero and trade is delayed with positive probability
for in¯nitely many times. Thus equilibrium delay of trade must occur with
non{trivial probability even in the complete information setting.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
. Every matched seller's equilibrium payo® ust in period t is given by
ust ´
Z
A
f¯maxfv(a)¡ U st ¡ U bt ; 0g+ U st ¡ c(a)gdft:
Let uS(a) be the function of a:
uS(a) ´ ¯maxfv(a)¡ U st ¡ U bt ; 0g+ U st ¡ c(a):
Then uS(a) can be written by
uS(a) =
8<:
¯fv(a)¡ U st+1 ¡ U bt+1g+ U st+1 ¡ c(a) for a such that v(a) > U st + U bt ,
U st ¡ c(a) otherwise:
Now suppose that ft(Anf0; asg) > 0. In particular take any a00 2 Anf0; asg
and suppose that uS(a00) ¸ maxfuS(0); uS(as)g. Then, since any seller can
choose a = 0 and guarantee at least the payo® U st , we must have uS(a
00) ¸
U st , which can be written by
¯maxfv(a00)¡ U bt ¡ U st ; 0g ¸ c(a00):
Then, since a00 > 0 and c(a00) > 0, v(a00) > U bt +U st must hold and hence the
above inequality yields v(a00)¡ c(a00)=¯ ¸ U bt + U st , which in turn implies
v(as)¡ c(as)=¯ > v(a00)¡ c(a00)=¯ ¸ U bt + U st
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by de¯nition of as and Assumption 1. Thus v(as) > U bt +U
b
t is satis¯ed and
then some matched seller will deviate to choose as with certainty and obtain
a higher payo® than uS(a00). This is a contradiction. Thus ft(Anf0; asg) = 0
must hold in any period t. Q.E.D.
7.2 Proof of Lemma 2
First suppose that at = as was realized according to the equilibrium strategy
xt in period t. Then, since as was realized, xt > 0 must be satis¯ed. Since
any seller can choose a = 0 and guarantee at least the payo® U st , we must
have
¯maxfv(as)¡ U bt ¡ U st ; 0g ¸ c(as);
which in turn implies v(as) > U bt + U
s
t due to c(a
s) > 0. Since ex post
surplus v(as) ¡ U bt ¡ U st is positive, trade must occur after at = as was
realized.
Second suppose that at = 0 was realized. This implies xt < 1. Then,
if v(0) ¸ U bt + U st holds, we have v(as) > U bt + U st and hence the seller is
better o® by choosing as with certainty due to Assumption 1. Thus it must
be the case that
v(0) < U bt + U
s
t
which shows that ex post surplus v(0)¡U bt ¡U st is negative and thus trade
never occurs after at = 0 was realized. Q.E.D.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 1
By Lemma 1, we can identify the seller's equilibrium strategy ft by the
probability xt 2 [0; 1] putting on a = as and the probability 1¡ xt on a = 0
respectively. Thus we will write the equilibrium strategy as xt instead of ft.
Take any equilibrium path fxt; U bt ; U st g1t=0. Then by Lemma 1 and 2,
the sum of the reservation values of a buyer and a seller can be written as
follows:
U bt + U
s
t = ±f®xt+1S(as) + (1¡ ®xt+1)(U bt+1 + U st+1)g (A1)
because every matched seller chooses the static equilibrium investment as
with probability xt 2 [0; 1] in period t, only in which case trade occurs and
the trade value S(as) is realized.
First we show that U bt + U
s
t < S(a
s) for all t. Suppose that U bT + U
s
T ¸
S(as) for some period T . Then by (A1) we have
S(as) · U bT + U sT
= ±f®xT+1S(as) + (1¡ ®xT+1)(U bT+1 + U sT+1)g
· ±®xT+1S(as) + (1¡ ±®xT+1)(U bT+1 + U sT+1)
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which shows S(as) · U bT+1 + U sT+1 because 1 > ±®xT+1. Repeating this
argument, we have U bk + U
s
k ¸ S(as) for all k ¸ T . This then implies that
U bk + U
s
k ¸ S(as) > v(as) ¡ c(as)=¯ and hence xk = 0 for all k ¸ T . Then,
by Lemma 2 trade never occurs in all periods k ¸ T and thus every player
obtains his or her outside payo®, zero, in each period from period T forever,
irrespective of matching a partner. However, then U ik = 0 for all k ¸ T and
i = b; s, which contradicts U bk + U
s
k ¸ S(as) > 0 for all k ¸ T . Thus we
must have S(as) > U bt + U
s
t for all t.
U it ¸ 0 must also hold for all t and i = b; s because any player can always
obtain his or her outside payo®, zero, in any period by rejecting trade.
Then we derive
U bt + U
s
t = ±f®xt+1S(as) + (1¡ ®xt+1)(U bt+1 + U st+1)g
· ±f®S(as) + (1¡ ®)(U bt+1 + U st+1)g
= ±
½
®S(as)
1¡ ±T¡1(1¡ ®)T¡1
1¡ ±(1¡ ®) + ±
T (U bT + U
s
T )
¾
where the inequality follows from the fact that S(as) > U bt + U
s
t for all t in
any equilibrium. Then, by taking large enough T (T !1) and noting that
U bT + U
s
T is bounded from above by S(a
s) and from below by zero, for the
above inequality to hold for any T , we must have
U bt + U
s
t ·
±®S(as)
1¡ ±(1¡ ®) ; 8 t:
Thus, the matched seller's payo® function uS(a) de¯ned by
uS(a) = ¯maxfv(a)¡ U st ¡ U bt ; 0g+ U st ¡ c(a);
can attain its maximum at a = as because
v(as)¡ c(as)=¯ > ±®S(a
s)
1¡ ±(1¡ ®) ¸ U
b
t + U
s
t
for all ± 2 (0; ±¤). This shows that each matched seller chooses as with
probability one. Q.E.D.
7.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Now take an equilibrium path e = fxt; U bt ; U st g1t=0. Then we show that
supL(e) = +1.
Suppose contrary to the claim that supL(e) < +1 in some equilibrium
e. Then there must exist some period T such that we have xt = 1 for any
t ¸ T .
Consider period T + 1. Then we ¯rst show that
U bT+1 + U
s
T+1 =
±®S(as)
1¡ ±(1¡ ®) :
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To see this, ¯rst suppose that U bT+1 + U
s
T+1 >
±®S(as)
1¡±(1¡®) . Then we can show
that U bT+2 + U
s
T+2 > U
b
T+1 + U
s
T+1 because, if not, since xT+2 = 1 we have
U bT+1 + U
s
T+1 = ±f®S(as) + (1¡ ®)(U bT+2 + U sT+2)g
· ±f®S(as) + (1¡ ®)(U bT+1 + U sT+1)g
which shows U bT+1+U
s
T+1 · ±®S(a
s)
1¡±(1¡®) , a contradiction. Thus U
b
T+2+U
s
T+2 >
U bT+1+U
s
T+1. Repeating this argument, we must have U
b
k+U
s
k > U
b
k¡1+U
s
k¡1
for all k ¸ T+2. However, then there must exist some period K (K ¸ T+1)
such that U bK + U
s
K > v(a
s) ¡ c(as)=¯, which implies xK = 0 but this
contradicts xt = 1 for all t > T . Thus we must have U bT+1+U
s
T+1 · ±®S(a
s)
1¡±(1¡®) .
Next suppose that U bT+1 + U
s
T+1 <
±®S(as)
1¡±(1¡®) . Then, by a similar argument,
we can show that U bk + U
s
k > U
b
k+1 + U
s
k+1 for all k ¸ T . However, then
U bM + U
s
M < 0 for some period M > T , which contradicts to U
i
t ¸ 0 for all
t and i = b; s. Thus we must have
U bT+1 + U
s
T+1 =
±®S(as)
1¡ ±(1¡ ®) :
Then, given this value, each matched seller's equilibrium payo® in period
T + 1 is written by
usT+1 ´ ¯fv(as)¡ U bT+1 ¡ U sT+1g+ U sT+1 ¡ c(as)
because xT+1 = 1. However, by substituting U bT+1 + U
s
T+1 =
±®S(as)
1¡±(1¡®) into
this expression, we can verify that for any ± 2 (±¤; 1) usT+1 must be less
than U sT+1 which can be attained at least by choosing aT+1 = 0. This is a
contradiction. Thus we must have supL(e) = +1. Q.E.D.
7.5 Proof of Proposition 3
For a positive integer K ¸ 1, de¯ne the sequence fUNt gKk=1 recursively as
follows:
UNk = ±U
N
k+1; k = 1; 2; :::;K ¡ 1;
and
UNK = ±f®S(as) + (1¡ ®)U Ig
where
U I = ±UN1 :
Solving these values, we obtain
UNk =
±K¡k+1®S(as)
1¡ ±K+1(1¡ ®) ; k = 1; 2; :::;K;
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and
U I =
±K+1®S(as)
1¡ ±K+1(1¡ ®) :
Since UN1 > U
I for all ± 2 (0; 1) and both UN1 and U I are increasing in ±,
we can ¯nd some ±K and ±K such that for all ± 2 (±K ; ±K),
UN1 =
±K®S(as)
1¡ ±K+1(1¡ ®) > v(a
s)¡ c(as)=¯ > U I = ±
K+1®S(as)
1¡ ±K+1(1¡ ®) :
Then, since UNk > U
N
k¡1 for all k = 2; 3; :::;K, we verify that U
N
k > v(a
s)¡
c(as)=¯ for all k = 1; 2; :::;K.
Now consider the following strategies of matched sellers: In period t =
¿K + ¿ ¡ 1 (¿ = 1; 2; :::) all matched sellers choose the static equilibrium
investment as with certainty. In all other periods all matched sellers choose
the least costly investment, zero, with certainty.
We also de¯ne the reservation values fU bt ; U st g1t=0 as follows:
U bt + U
s
t =
8<:
U I for t = ¿K + ¿ ¡ 1 (¿ = 1; 2; :::);
UNk for t = k ¡ 1 (mod K + 1), k = 1; 2; :::;K:
Then, the above strategies become optimal, given these reservation values
because ¯fv(as) ¡ U bt ¡ U st g ¸ c(as) for all t = ¿K + ¿ ¡ 1 (¿ = 1; 2; :::),
which implies choosing at = as is optimal, while ¯fv(as)¡U bt ¡U st g < c(as)
for all other periods, which imply choosing at = 0 is optimal.
Finally, the above sellers' strategies are consistent with the construction
of the reservation values. Q.E.D.
7.6 Proof of Proposition 5
By Proposition 1 we know that equilibrium is unique and same as the static
one when ± 2 (0; ±¤): In every period matched seller chooses the static
equilibrium investment as with probability one. Thus this equilibrium is
trivially constrained e±cient because no other equilibria exist.
Next we will turn to the case that ± 2 (±¤; 1). In this case multiple
equilibria arise for some discount factors as we have shown in Proposition 3
and 4.
Consider the equilibrium e^ shown in Lemma 3 and note that the social
welfare under e^ can be written by
W (±je^) = ®x^0S(as) + (1¡ ®x^0) + (1¡ ®)(U^ bt + U^ st )g
= ®S(as) + (1¡ ®)[v(as)¡ c(as)=¯]
for ± 2 (±¤; 1) because
v(as)¡ c(as)=¯ = ±®x
¤S(as)
1¡ ±(1¡ ®x¤) :
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and
U^ bt + U^
s
t =
±®x¤S(as)
1¡ ±(1¡ ®x¤) 8 t:
Now take any other equilibrium, ~e = f~xt; ~U bt ; ~U st g1t=0, than e^. Then we
have the social welfare under ~e as
W (±j~e) = ®~x0S(as) + (1¡ ®~x0)( ~U b0 + ~U s0 )
where
~U bt + ~U
s
t = ±f®~xt+1S(as) + (1¡ ®~xt+1)( ~U bt+1 + ~U st+1)g; t = 1; 2; :::
We will consider the following separate cases:
CASE 1: v(as)¡ c(as)=¯ ¸ ~U b0 + ~U s0 .
In this case we have
W (±j~e) = ®~x0S(as) + (1¡ ®~x0)( ~U b0 + ~U s0 )
· ®~x0S(as) + (1¡ ®~x0)[v(as)¡ c(as)=¯]
· ®S(as) + (1¡ ®)[v(as)¡ c(as)=¯]
= W (±je^)
where the ¯rst inequality follows from our supposition above and the sec-
ond inequality from the fact that S(as) = v(as) ¡ c(as) > v(as) ¡ c(as)=¯
respectively.
Thus the equilibrium ~e never attains higher welfare than e^.
CASE 2: v(as)¡ c(as)=¯ < ~U b0 + ~U s0 .
In this case we have ~x0 = 0. Let T > 0 be the period such that ~xt = 0 for
any t < T but ~xT > 0. 11
Then, by ~xT > 0, we must have
v(as)¡ c(as)=¯ ¸ ~U bT + ~U sT :
Under the equilibrium path ~e, we then obtain
W (±j~e) = ±T f®~xTS(as) + (1¡ ®~xT )( ~U bT+1 + ~U sT+1)g
· ±T f®~xTS(as) + (1¡ ®~xT )[v(as)¡ c(as)=¯]
· ±f®~xTS(as) + (1¡ ®~xT )[v(as)¡ c(as)=¯]g
· ±f®S(as) + (1¡ ®)[v(as)¡ c(as)=¯]g
< ®S(as) + (1¡ ®)[v(as)¡ c(as)=¯]
= W (±je^)
11If xt = 0 for all t, then by Lemma 2 no trades are realized in all periods and hence
W (±j~e) = 0, which is less than W (±je^) > 0.
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where the ¯rst inequality follows from v(as)¡c(as)=¯ ¸ ~U bK+ ~U sK , the second
inequality from ± < 1, the third inequality from S(as) > v(as)¡c(as)=¯ and
the last equality from the de¯nition of e^ respectively. Thus there exist no
other equilibria which is more e±cient than e^ in this case as well. Q.E.D.
7.7 Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose not, i.e., sup~L(e) < +1 in some equilibrium e. This means that
there exists some ¯nite time T ¸ 0 such that for all t ¸ T we have xt(µ; Ã) =
1 for all (µ; Ã) 2 £ £ ª. Thus, by using a smilar logic to the proof of
Proposition 2, we can show that the sum of the reservation values must be
stationary from period T onward and hence be constant at Ub + Us, i.e.,
U b + U s = ±f®Eµ;Ã[S(as(µ; Ã); µ; Ã)] + (1¡ ®)(Ub + US)g
where S(a; µ; Ã) ´ v(a; µ)¡ c(a; Ã) is the ex ante total surplus.
Solving this, we have
U b + U s =
®±Eµ;Ã[S(as(µ; Ã); µ; Ã)]
1¡ ±(1¡ ®) :
Take some (µ00; Ã00) 2 ££ª such that S(as(µ00; Ã00); µ00; Ã00) · Eµ;Ã[S(as(µ; Ã); µ; Ã)].
Then we obtain
v(as(µ00; Ã00); µ)¡c(as(µ00; Ã00); Ã00)=¯ < S(as(µ00; Ã00); µ00; Ã00) · Eµ;Ã[S(as(µ; Ã); µ; Ã)]
which shows that there exists some ± 2 (0; 1) such that for all ± 2 (±; 1) we
must have
v(as(µ00; Ã00))¡ c(as(µ00; Ã00))=¯ < ±®Eµ;Ã[S(a
s(µ; Ã); µ; Ã)]
1¡ ±(1¡ ®) :
Thus seller of type Ã00 will never choose as(µ00; Ã00) when he matches with
buyer of type µ00 in any period t ¸ T , which implies xt(µ00; Ã00) = 1 for all
t ¸ T . However this is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
7.8 Proof of Proposition 7
Consider the following reservation values:
U bt = U
b ´ ±®S(a
m)
1¡ ±(1¡ ®) ; U
s
t = U
s ´ 0 8 t:
Then we will show that, given these reservation values, each matched buyer
optimally o®ers the cost minimizing contract C¤ and each matched seller
chooses the cost minimizing investment am with certainty in any period.
Lemma A1. Given C¤ and (U b; U s), every matched seller optimally chooses
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am with certainty when ± is large.
Proof. Suppose that matched seller chooses am. Then the voluntary trade
conditions under C¤ are satis¯ed:
b(am)¡ P 1 = S(am) > P 0 + U b = ±®S(a
m)
1¡ ±(1¡ ®) ;
and
P 1 ¡ d(am) = c(am) > P 0 + U s = 0:
Thus, if the seller chooses am, he obtains the payo® P 1¡d(am)¡c(am) = 0.
Now suppose that the seller chooses a 6= am. Then, if the voluntary
trade conditions still hold, he obtains the payo® P 1 ¡ d(a) ¡ c(a) which is
less than zero by de¯nition of am. If the voluntary trade conditions are not
satis¯ed, then renegotiation may happen and hence the seller can obtain at
most
us(a) = ¯maxfv(a)¡ U s ¡ U b; 0g+ U s ¡ c(a):
Note here that, if b(a) < U b, the seller's renegotiation payment o®er does
not satisfy his limited liability and hence renegotiation fails, in which case
the seller obtains U s ¡ c(a). Thus the most pro¯table case for the seller is
that b(a) > U b and thus renegotiation succeeds, in which case his payo® is
given as us(a) above. However, by Assumption 3, for large ± we have
U
b + U s =
±®S(am)
1¡ ±(1¡ ®) > v(a
s)¡ c(as)=¯:
Thus maxa2A us(a) = U
s = 0 when ± is high enough, which shows that the
seller's deviation payo® is not higher than zero. Thus in either case the seller
has no incentives to deviate from choosing am. Q.E.D.
Lemma A2. Every matched buyer optimally o®ers C¤ when ± is large,
given (U b; U s).
Proof. If a matched buyer o®ers C¤, then she can obtain the payo® S(am)
by Lemma A1 when ± is large. Then we will show that the buyer cannot
obtain higher payo® by o®ering di®erent contracts.
To see this, suppose that some matched buyer o®ers C^ = fP^ 1; P^ 0g 6= C¤
and that her matched seller's investment is realized as a^ according to his
mixed strategy, given this contract. We can suppose that a^ > 0 because, if
the seller's mixed strategy puts all positive probabilities on a = 0, then the
buyer's payo® must be at most S(0), which is less than his reservation value
U
b when ± is large enough.12
12For large ±, Ub can be close to S(am) which is higher than S(0) because S(am) =
b(am)¡ (d(am) + c(am)) > b(am)¡ (d(0) + c(0)) > S(0) = b(0)¡ d(0)¡ c(0).
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Suppose ¯rst that the voluntary trade conditions are satis¯ed under C^:
b(a^)¡ P^ 1 ¸ ¡P^ 0 + U b; (A2)
P^ 1 ¡ d(a^) ¸ P^ 0 + U s: (A3)
Thus the seller obtains the payo® P^ 1 ¡ d(a^)¡ c(a^).
Note also that the buyer can guarantee the payo® S(am) by o®ering
C¤ because the seller accepts it and chooses am following no renegotiation
(due to Lemma A1). Then, since S(am) > U b, the buyer's deviation payo®
must be strictly higher than his reservation value U b. From this, the above
¯rst voluntary trade condition (A2) must be satis¯ed with strict inequality
because otherwise the buyer's payo® is not higher than the reservation value
U b, i.e., ¡P^ 0 + U b · U b due to P^ 0 ¸ 0.
We will then show that a^ = am must hold. To see this, suppose a^ 6= am
and consider two separate cases:
CASE 1: P^ 1 ¡ d(a^) = P^ 0 + U s.
In this case the seller obtains the payo® P^ 1 ¡ d(a^) ¡ c(a^). However, if
the seller slightly reduces investment from a^ > 0 and chooses a0 < a^ (this is
possible because A is closed interval and c is continuous), then renegotiation
may or may not occur. In either case the seller obtains at least the following
payo®
U s + P^ 0 ¡ c(a0) = P^ 1 ¡ d(a^)¡ c(a0)
which is higher than the supposed payo® P^ 1¡d(a^)¡c(a^) due to c(a^) > c(a0).
Thus the seller has the incentive to deviate from a^.
CASE 2: P^ 1 ¡ d(a^) > P^ 0 + U s.
In this case, if the seller can slightly change investment level from a^ towards
am and choose a0, then the voluntary trade conditions can be still satis¯ed
because b and d are continuous and we already know that the voluntary
trade condition for the buyer (A2) is strictly satis¯ed under a = a^. Thus
the seller can obtain the following payo®
P^ 1 ¡ d(a0)¡ c(a0)
which is higher than the supposed payo® P^ 1 ¡ d(a^) ¡ c(a^) (by a0 ! am).
Thus the seller has the incentive to deviate from a^.
The above CASE 1 and 2 show that a^ = am. However, for the purpose
of implementing a = am given the reservation values U b and U s, it is the
most pro¯table for the buyer to o®er the contract C¤ because then she can
extract the full surplus S(am) for implementing am. This implies that each
matched buyer has no incentives to o®er other contracts than C¤, given the
reservation values (U b; U s).
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Thus the remaining case is only that renegotiation happens under the
deviation contract C^. In that case the payo®s of the parties are determined
by the ex post bargaining. Then the seller will obtain the following payo®
from the supposed investment level a^:
us(a^) = ¯maxfv(a^)¡ U b ¡ U s; 0g+ U s + P^0 ¡ c(a^):
However, since U b + U s = ±®S(a
m)
1¡±(1¡®) > v(a
s) ¡ c(as)=¯ for large ± under
Assumption 3, we have
us(a^) · U s + P^ 0 ¡ c(a^):
Thus the seller must have chosen a^ = 0 with certainty.
Then the buyer's payo® can be at most
(1¡ ¯)maxfv(0)¡ U b ¡ U s; 0g+ U b ¡ P^ 0
which is however not larger than U b because we have U b+U s = ±®S(a
m)
1¡±(1¡®) >
v(as) ¡ c(as)=¯ > v(0). Since the buyer can obtain S(am) by o®ering the
ex ante contract C¤ and S(am) > U b, she optimally o®ers the contract C¤.
Q.E.D.
Lemma A1 and A2 have established the result that every matched buyer
o®ers the cost minimizing contract C¤ and every matched seller chooses am
with certainty, given U b = ±®S(a
m)
1¡±(1¡®) and U
s = 0. Also these reservation
values are consistent with the contract o®er of buyers and investment choice
of sellers as well. Thus this can be a stationary equilibrium. Q.E.D.
7.9 Proof of the Remark
We make the mild assumption that d(a) + c(a) is increasing in a 2 (am; a]
(this will hold when d + c is convex function). We de¯ne the ¯rst best
investment as a¤ which maximizes ex ante surplus S(a). Then, ¯x any pair
of reservation values (U bt ; U
s
t ) in period t and consider the following ex ante
contract fP 1t ; P 0t g:
b(a¤)¡ U bt = P 1t ¡ P 0t ¸ d(a¤) + U st ;
which is o®ered by a matched buyer. Note here that U bt + U
s
t < S(a
¤) for
all t and hence such P 1t and P
0
t exist for these inequalities to be satis¯ed.
Given this contract, the voluntary trade conditions hold if the seller
chooses a¤. In that case the seller obtains P 1t ¡ d(a¤)¡ c(a¤). On the other
hand, if the seller chooses a < a¤, then these conditions will not hold (since
b(a) < b(a¤) for a < a¤) and hence renegotiation will occur. Then the seller
obtains the payo® ¯maxfv(a)¡U bt ¡U st ; 0g+U st +P 0t ¡ c(a). However, this
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is less than the payo® P 1t ¡d(a¤)¡ c(a¤) obtained by choosing a¤. Since the
seller has no incentives to choose a > a¤,13 the seller optimally chooses a¤.
Then the buyer can extract the full surplus S(a¤) by setting P 0t = U bt¡S(a¤).
Q.E.D.
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Social Welfare in Stationary Equilibrium
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Social Welfare in Non{Stationary Equilibrium
W (±je^)
44
